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Discussing What Would Happen:
The Role of Thought Experiments
in Galileo’s Dialogues
Carla Rita Palmerino*y
Thought experiments play an important epistemic, rhetorical, and didactic function in
Galileo’s dialogues. In some cases, Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio agree about what
would happen in an imaginary scenario and try to understand whether the predicted out-
come is compatible with their respective theoretical assumptions. There are, however,
also situations in which the predictions of the three interlocutors turn out to be theory
laden. Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio not only disagree about what would happen, but
they reject one another’s solutions as question begging and sometimes even dismiss one
another’s thought experiments as misleading or nonsensical.
1. Introduction. Although Galileo’s name ﬁgures virtually in all studies
on thought experiments, little attention has been paid to his views on the heu-
ristic and rhetorical power of imaginary scenarios. Kristian Camilleri has re-
cently tried to ﬁll this lacuna by analyzing the role that thought experiments
play in Galileo’s vision of science. Camilleri offers a classiﬁcation of Gali-
leo’s thought experiments that is based on the different epistemic strategies
that he “invoked in trying to address the question of how one can know what
would happen in an imaginary scenario” (Camilleri 2015, 103). Despite his
oft-repeated warning that “thought experiments are not in themselves sources
of knowledge” (105, 111), Camilleri seems especially interested in the de-
monstrative function of Galileo’s thought experiments. His main aim is to
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show how, in the Dialogue, Galileo’s spokesman, Salviati, invokes imagi-
nary scenarios in order to “convince” his two interlocutors, the Aristotelian
Simplicio and the independently minded Sagredo, “of the truth of a proposi-
tion” to which they were “initially unwilling to give assent” (Camilleri 2015,
103).
In this article, I argue that, in Galileo’s dialogues, thought experiments
function less as demonstrative tools than as magnifying glasses that render
the different theoretical assumptions of the three interlocutors visible. Rather
than focusing on the conclusions that Galileo draws from his thought exper-
iments, one should, I suggest, look at the discussions that Sagredo, Salviati,
and Simplicio conduct and at the arguments they use to motivate their pre-
dictions about what would happen in a given imaginary situation.
I ﬁrst discuss some examples in which the three characters agree about
what would happen in an imaginary scenario and try to understand whether
the predicted outcome is consistent with their respective theoretical assump-
tions. Then I present a few cases in which their predictions differ. As we will
see, in these cases Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio accuse one another of
begging the question in the evaluation of a thought experiment and some-
times even refuse to make a prediction on a scenario described by the inter-
locutor.
2. Agreeing on What Would Happen. Galileo would have certainly
agreed withMurdoch (1982) and Grant (2002) that scholastic natural philos-
ophy had lost touch with nature, espousing a type of “empiricism without
observation.” In his writings, Galileo routinely accuses his scholastic oppo-
nents of basing their conclusions on Aristotle’s ideas rather than on a careful
observation of the book of nature.
This is what happens, for example, in a passage of the second day of the
Dialogue, where Salviati criticizes Simplicio for endorsing Aristotle’s view
that the motion of projectiles is due to the propelling action of the medium.
How can Simplicio be “so credulous”when he has “his own senses to refute
this claim?” Does he not see that if projectile motion were really caused by
the medium, as he believes, then light bodies should move faster and farther
than heavy ones? Simplicio has not yet answered these questions, when
Sagredo intervenes in the discussion to present an imaginary scenario.
SAGREDO: There is another point of Aristotle’s which I should like to
understand, and I beg Simplicio to oblige me with an answer. If two ar-
rows were shot with the same bow, one in the usual way and one side-
ways—that is, putting the arrow lengthwise along the cord and shoot-
ing it that way—I should like to know which one would go the farther?
Please reply, even though the question may seem to you more ridicu-
lous than otherwise. (Galilei 1967, 152)
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Simplicio replies that although he has “never seen an arrow shot sideways,”
he thinks “it would not go even one-twentieth the distance of one shot point
ﬁrst.” Sagredo agrees with this conclusion but emphasizes that it contradicts
Aristotle’s account of projectile motion:
SAGREDO: Since this is just what I thought, it gives me occasion to raise
a question between Aristotle’s dictum and experience. For as to experi-
ence, if I were to place arrows upon that table when a strong wind was
blowing, one in the direction of thewind and the other across it, thewind
would quickly carry away the latter and leave the former. Now appar-
ently the same ought to happen with two shots from a bow, if Aristotle’s
doctrine were true, because the one going sideways would be spurred
on by a great quantity of air moved by the bowstring—as much as the
whole length of the arrow—whereas the other arrow would receive the
impulse from only as much air as there is in the tiny circle of its thick-
ness. I cannot imagine the cause of such a disparity, and I should like
very much to know it. (Galilei 1967, 153)
Here, as in many other passages of the Dialogue, Galileo suggests that the
only way to reason about situations that one cannot directly observe, is to ex-
plain them by analogywithmore familiar phenomena (Palmerino 2011, 108).
If air were responsible for the motion of projectiles, then the two arrows shot
with a bow should display the same behavior as the two arrows carried away
by thewind. Simplicio rebuts that there is an “obvious” reasonwhy this is not
the case: “it is because the arrow shot point foremost has to penetrate only a
small quantity of air, and the other has to cleave as much as its whole length”
(Galilei 1967, 153). As Sagredo points out, however, this answer is at odds
with Simplicio’s proposed explanation of projectile motion:
SAGREDO: Oh, so when arrows are shot they have to penetrate the air?
If the air goes with them, or rather if it is the very thing which conducts
them, what penetration can there be? Do you not see that in such a man-
ner the arrow would be moving faster than the air? Nowwhat conferred
this greater velocity upon the arrow?Do youmean it to say that air gives
it a greater speed than its own? (Galilei 1967, 153)
What Sagredo has in mind is obviously Aristotle’s notion of antiperistasis,
or “circulating thrust” (Physics 215a15), according to which a projectile di-
vides the air, which then rushes from the front to the back of the projectile
pushing it forward. Simplicio’s claim that the arrow has to penetrate the air
suggests that the air is slower than the arrow and can therefore not be the
cause of its motion. Sagredo hence concludes “that the whole thing takes
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place just exactly the opposite to what Aristotle says, and that is as false that
the medium confers motion upon the projectile as it is true that it is this alone
which impedes it” (Galilei 1967, 153). Simplicio’s guess that the arrow shot
sideways would be slower than the arrow shot point ﬁrst is in agreement with
everyday experience, which shows that the medium offers resistance to mo-
tion, but not with Aristotle’s theory of projectile motion, which regards the
medium as a propelling force. This gives to Salviati the occasion to point out
that in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, there are “many propositions . . . that
are not only wrong, but wrong in such a way that their diametrical opposites
are true” (Galilei 1967, 153).
In the Dialogue, Aristotle’s theory of free fall is presented as equally im-
plausible and counterintuitive as his explanation of projectile motion.When,
in a passage of the second day, Simplicio endorses Aristotle’s claim that “the
speeds of falling heavy bodies have among themselves the same proportions
as their weights,” Salviati invites him to imagine “a hundred-pound ball and
a one-pound ball of the same material being dropped at the same moment
from a height of one hundred yards.” Salviati does not believe that Simplicio
can “picture in his mind the large ball striking the groundwhile the small one
is less than a yard from the top of the tower” (Galilei 1967, 223). The Aris-
totelian does not get the chance to reply, as Sagredo intervenes in the discus-
sion steering it in a new direction.
A reply to Salviati’s argument was offered by an Aristotelian in ﬂesh and
blood. Antonio Rocco, in his Esercitazioni ﬁlosoﬁche (1633) written in re-
action to the Dialogue, endorsed Aristotle’s view and challenged Galileo to
demonstrate not with experience but with reason that the speed of fall cannot
be proportional to the weight of the falling body (Galilei 1890–1909, 7:687).
Galileo penned somePostille to theEsercitazioni, in which he described “the
intellectual repugnance” he had experienced upon ﬁrst reading Aristotle’s
treatment of the problem (Physics 215a25–28) and recalled having formu-
lated a counterargument. He imagined two bricks of equal size and weight
that are dropped together from a high tower and, during their fall, all of a sud-
den join together. Galileo argued that it would be absurd to suppose that the
speed of the joined bricks suddenly doubled, given that neither of the twowas
able to add an impetus to the other. Galileo then proceeded to a “more strin-
gent demonstration” that consisted in imagining the joint fall of two bodies A
and B, the ﬁrst of which is “naturally faster” than the second one. “The union
of A and B will result in a compound of speeds greater than the speed of B
alone, but smaller than the speed of A alone; but given that the compound of
A and B is greater than A alone, it follows that the greater mobile AB will
move less fast than the smaller mobile B; which is against the supposition”
(Galilei 1890–1909, 7:732; my translation).
Aristotle’s theory of the proportionality between speed and weight is dis-
cussed once again in the Two New Sciences, whereGalileo reworks the argu-
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ment of thePostille intowhat has become one of the most famous thought ex-
periments in the history of science.
In the ﬁrst day of that work, Salviati explicitly questions that “Aristotle
ever tested whether it is true that two stones, one ten times as heavy as the
other, both released at the same instant to fall from a height, say, of one hun-
dredbraccia, differed somuch in their speeds that upon the arrival of the larger
stone upon the ground, the other would be found to have descended no more
than ten braccia” (Galilei 1989, 66). Simplicio reacts by pointing out that
Aristotle’s language in Physics 215a25–28—“we see that the velocity of a
moving weight or mass depends on . . . the comparative gravity or levity of
the moving body itself ” (Aristotle 1929, 351)—seems to indicate that he
made the experiment. As was to be expected, the interlocutors are not satis-
ﬁed with this answer. Sagredo invokes the result of a test he himself hasmade,
whereas Salviati prefers to appeal to the following imaginary scenario:
SALVIATI: But [even] without other experiences, by a short and conclu-
sive demonstration, we can prove clearly that it is not true that a heavier
body is moved more swiftly than another, less heavy, these being of the
same material. . . . Tell me, Simplicio, whether you assume that for ev-
ery heavy falling body there is a speed determined by nature such that
this cannot be increased or diminished except by using force or oppos-
ing some impediment to it.
SIMPLICIO: There can be no doubt that a given body in a given medium
has an established speed determined by nature, which cannot be in-
creased except by conferring on it some new impetus, nor diminished
save by some impediment that retards it.
SALVIATI: Then if we had two bodies whose natural speeds were un-
equal, it is evident that were we to connect the slower to the faster, the
latter would be partly retarded by the slower, and this would be partly
speeded up by the faster. Do you not agree with me in this opinion?
SIMPLICIO: It seems to me that this would undoubtedly follow. (Galilei
1989, 66–67)
Salviati’s next argumentative step consists in pointing out that Simplicio’s
prediction conﬂicts with Aristotle’s hypothesis that the speed of fall is pro-
portional to the weight:
SALVIATI: But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of,
say, eight while a smaller moveswith a speed of four, thenwhen they are
united, the system will move with a speed less than eight; but the two
stones when tied together make a stone larger than that which before
moved with a speed of eight. Hence the heavier body moves with less
speed than the lighter; an effect which is contrary to your supposition.
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Thus you see how, from your assumption that the heavier body moves
more rapidly than the lighter one, I infer that the heavier body moves
more slowly. (Galilei 1989, 67)
Salviati makes use here of an argument ex concessione. He grants to Sim-
plicio an assumption to which he himself does not subscribe, that is, that
the speed of a falling body is proportional to its weight, and draws from it a
conclusion “unwelcome to the opponent” (Jardine 1991, 113).
There has beenmuch discussion in the literature about the cogency of Ga-
lileo’s argument. Brown (2000, 528) has singled it out as a perfect example
of a Platonic thought experiment, which “gives a grip on nature just by think-
ing.” Norton (1996, 2004) has used it to prove, against Brown, that thought
experiments are just logical arguments in disguise. Gendler (1998) has used
it to argue, against Norton, that thought experiments can lead to rationally
justiﬁed conclusions that would not be rationally justiﬁable on the basis of a
straightforward argument. Whereas Atkinson and Peijnenburg (2004, 127)
have maintained, against Gendler, that Galileo’s argument is “logically deﬁ-
cient” and fails “to adequately describe the empirical world.”
Palmieri has rightly pointed out that scholars interested in “the epistemic
status” of past thought experiments should be careful not to examine them
according to “a modern frame of mind.” What “might today be seen as an
instance of a very special form of cognition . . . was born in the murky wa-
ters of analogical thinking, ex post facto cognitive autobiography, and, in all
likelihood, real experimentation” (Palmieri 2005, 238). The “cognitive au-
tobiography” mentioned by Palmieri is the Postille to Antonio Rocco, in
which, as we have seen, Galileo “reconstructs” an old argument of his against
Aristotle’s theory.
I have little to add to Palmieri’s reconstruction of the historical and theo-
retical context in which Galileo’s thought experiment originated. For the
current purposes, it sufﬁces to notice that when recasting the reductio ad ab-
surdum argument of the Postille in the Two New Sciences, Galileo scripts a
Socratic dialogue in which Simplicio endorses Salviati’s conclusion that the
faster bodywould be partly retarded by the slower and the slower partly sped
up by the faster. We have here a good example of what Cantor (1989, 172)
has called a “literary road to consensus.” The fact that Simplicio provides no
motivation for his belief adds persuasiveness to the counterargument, mak-
ing the conclusion appear obvious to the reader. At this point, it is easy for
Salviati to show that Simplicio’s prediction is “contrary to his supposition.”
For if bodies fell with a speed that was proportional to their weight, then the
two bodies tied together should fall faster than either of the two on its own.
Galileo uses a similar argumentative strategy in his criticism of Aristot-
le’s causal explanation of the motion of fall. In the second day of the Dia-
logue, Simplicio argues, following Aristotle, that heavy bodies are drawn
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by an internal principle toward “the centre of the universe,” which by acci-
dent coincides with the center of the earth. The motion of fall is therefore
natural, whereas the motion upward is per deﬁnition preternatural and can
only be caused by an external principle. In order to convince his interlocutor
that the “principle which moves heavy projectiles upward . . . is no less in-
ternal and natural than that which moves them downward” (Galilei 1967,
345), Salviati asks him to imagine that “the terrestrial globe were pierced
by a hole which passed through its centre” and a cannon ball were dropped
into this hole.
SALVIATI: Having arrived at the centre is it your belief that it would
pass on beyond, or that it would immediately stop its motion there?
SIMPLICIO: I think it would keep on going a long way.
SALVIATI: Now wouldn’t this motion beyond the centre be upward, and
according to what you have said preternatural and constrained? But
upon what other principle will you make it depend, other than that which
you have already called intrinsic and natural? Let me see you ﬁnd an
external thrower who shall overtake it once more to throw it upward.
(Galilei 1967, 236)
The thought experiment of the ball falling through a tunnel traversing the
center of the earth has a long history. Its ﬁrst known occurrence is in Plu-
tarch’s dialogue De facie (924a 8–12, b 4–8), a text with which Galileo was
certainly acquainted (Casini 1984; Shea 2000; Fabbri 2012). Medieval and
earlymodern Aristotelians often discussed the imaginary scenario in the con-
text of their treatment of natural motion, proposing two different solutions.
Some of them argued, in conformity with Aristotle’s theory of gravity, that
the ballwould stop as soon as it reached the center of the earth,whereas others
maintained, in accordance with the impetus theory, that the ball would oscil-
late around the center of the earth and would only come to rest once the im-
petus was exhausted (Hooykaas 1999; Palmerino 2011, 107–8).
Given that in theDialogue Simplicio explicitly criticizes the impetus the-
ory (Galilei 1967, 149–50), one would expect him to endorse the ﬁrst solu-
tion, and yet he predicts that the cannon ball will “keep going a long way.” It
is at this point easy for Salviati to point out that Simplicio’s solution is in
contradiction with his proposed explanation of gravity and with the dichot-
omy between natural and violent motion, which would require the body to
stop immediately at the center of the earth.
In this section, we have seen Salviati and Sagredo submit imaginary sce-
narios to Simplicio’s scrutiny, with the intention of testing the cogency of
Aristotle’s theory of motion. Time and again the Aristotelian instinctively
agrees with his interlocutors about what would happen and is subsequently
led to realize that his proposed outcome is at odds with his theoretical as-
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sumptions. In the Dialogue, however, one also encounters text passages in
which Simplicio appeals to thought experiments in order to confute Coper-
nicus’s heliocentric theory. Here, as we see in the following section, the in-
terlocutors offer divergent answers to the “what would happen?” question.
3. Disagreeing on What Would Happen. The most famous example of a
thought experiment that elicits different intuitions in Salviati and Simplicio
is that of the ball dropped from the mast of a moving ship. In the second day
of the Dialogue, Simplicio argues that, on a rotating earth, a body dropped
from a high tower could not fall parallel to the tower because this would re-
quire having two natural motions at the same time, notably “a straight one
towards the centre, and a circular one about the centre” (Galilei 1967, 140–
41). In support of this claim, he quotes “a very appropriate experiment,” one
that was adduced by the supporters of a geocentric cosmology as a proof of
the impossibility of the daily rotation of the earth (Ariotti 1972; Grant 1984,
36–42). According to Simplicio, the behavior of a ball dropped from a tower
on a moving earth should be inferred from that “of the stone dropped from
the top of the mast of a ship, which falls to the foot of the mast when the ship
is standing still, but falls as far from that same point when the ship is sailing”
(Galilei 1967, 141). At this point, Galileo pens a very interesting dialogue, in
which Salviati and Simplicio agree, ﬁrst, that the “result of the earth”must be
similar to “that on the ship” and, second, that if the stone dropped from the
mast fell on the same place on the ship in motion as on the ship at rest, the
experiment could be of no use in determining whether the ship is sailing.
SALVIATI: Very good. Now, have you ever made this experiment of the
ship?
SIMPLICIO: I have never made it, but I certainly believe that the author-
ities who adduced it had carefully observed it. . . .
SALVIATI: You yourself are sufﬁcient evidence that those authors may
have offered it without having performed it, for you take it as certain
without having done it. . . . For anyone who does will ﬁnd that the ex-
periment shows exactly the opposite of what is written; that is, it will
show that the stone always falls in the same place on the ship, whether
the ship is standing still or moving with any speed you please. There-
fore, the same cause holding good on the earth as on the ship, nothing
can be inferred about the earth’s motion or rest from the stone falling al-
ways perpendicularly to the foot of the tower. (Galilei 1967, 144–45)
It would seem as if Salviati is using the result of a real experiment to debunk
an objection based on a pseudoexperiment. Surprisingly enough, he admits,
however, that he has not performed the experiment either:
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SIMPLICIO: So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet
you freely declare it to be certain? I shall retain my incredulity, and my
own conﬁdence that the experiment has been made by the most impor-
tant authors who make use of it. . . .
SALVIATI: Without experiment, I am sure that the effect will happen as I
tell you, because it must happen that way; and I might add that you your-
self also know that it cannot happen otherwise, no matter how you may
pretend not to know it. (Galilei 1967, 145)
It is likely that Galileo had in fact performed the experiment of the falling
stone on a ship, as he himself acknowledged in his letter to Francesco Ingoli
of 1624 (Galilei 1890–1909, 6:545).Butwhy thendidhe feign to speak “with-
out experiment”? He did so, I think, not out of prudence (Ariotti 1972, 201–
2) but rather in order to emphasize that theoretical assumptions inﬂuence our
predictions concerning the behavior of physical bodies. Salviati tries to con-
vince his Aristotelian interlocutor that horizontal motion and motion down-
ward can be combined, as they are neither “destructive of one another, nor
incompatible,” but Simplicio retorts that the argument, although “very plau-
sible in appearance, . . . is offset by a difﬁculty which is hard to overcome”
because it was built on a premise “which will not lightly be granted by the
Peripatetic school.” It is in fact “contrary to Aristotle” to assume that a pro-
jectile “when separated from its origin retains the motion which was forcibly
impressed upon it there” (Galilei 1967, 149).
This is not the only instance in the Dialogue in which Galileo shows that
our contemplation of imaginary scenarios is theory laden. Something similar
happens in a passage of the ﬁrst day where Simplicio argues, in accordance
with Aristotle’s theory of natural places, that “if the terrestrial globe were forc-
ibly removed from the place assigned to it by nature, it would return by a
straight line.” The Aristotelian infers this conclusion from the behavior of
earthly bodies, which “removed from the whole . . . return to their places nat-
urally and spontaneously in a straight motion” (Galilei 1967, 33).
Salviati is quick to point out that Simplicio’s conclusion is question beg-
ging, as it presupposes without proof “that the earth is de facto the centre of
the universe.” But what if gravity were a universal tendency of bodies to re-
unite with their whole? On the basis of this assumption, Salviati formulates
a counter thought experiment:
SALVIATI: Now just as all the parts of the earth mutually cooperate to
form its whole . . . why may we not believe that the sun, moon and
other world bodies are also round in shape merely by a concordant in-
stinct and natural tendencies of all their component parts? If at any time
one of these parts were forcibly separated from the whole, is it not rea-
sonable to believe that it would return spontaneously and by natural
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tendency? And in this manner we should conclude that straight motion
is equally suitable to all world bodies. (Galilei 1967, 33–34)
This time, Simplicio does not offer an alternative interpretation of the imag-
inary scenario but simply refuses to make a prediction, arguing that what
Salviati inquires into “would be the consequences of an impossibility.” One
could in fact never detach a part from the sun or the moon because, “as Aris-
totle also demonstrates, celestial bodies are invariant, impenetrable, and un-
breakable.” To this, the Aristotelian adds the puzzling remark that even if
the situation described bySalviati should arise, “and the separated part did re-
turn to itswhole, itwouldnot return thusbecauseofbeingheavyor light, since
Aristotle also proves that celestial bodies are neither heavy nor light” (Gali-
lei 1967, 34). Salviati cannot but castigate Simplicio once again for his “fail-
ure to perceive that Aristotle assumes what is in question. . . . None of the
conditions by which Aristotle distinguishes celestial from elemental bodies
has any other foundation than that what he deduces from the difference in
natural motion between the former and the latter” (35–37).
We have just seen a case in which Simplicio rejects a thought experiment
put forward by Salviati on the grounds that the imagined situation could
never take place. In another passage of the Dialogue, it is Galileo’s spokes-
man who discards as nonsensical two thought experiments invoked by Sim-
plicio to argue against the earth’s natural motion.
In the second day of the Dialogue, Simplicio cites some passages from
theDisquisitiones mathematicae (1614) of the German Jesuit Johann Georg
Locher, which argue for what Finocchiaro has aptly called “the inexplica-
bility of terrestrial rotation” (2013, 145). According to Locher, it was absurd
to think that terrestrial objects could participate in the daily rotation of the
earth and that the same internal principle could be responsible for the circular
motion of birds, stones, arrows, snow, and ﬁsh, “their natures being most di-
verse” (Galilei 1967, 239–40). The Jesuit tried to strengthen his argument by
invoking some counterfactual scenarios: What “if the earth should stop by
the will of God?” Would ﬂying birds and falling bodies continue to rotate?
If not, then one could not regard their circular motion as natural; if yes, then
“it would be truly remarkable if the seagull could not hover over the small
ﬁsh, the skylark over her nest, and the crow over the snail and the rock” (Ga-
lilei 1967, 240). And what if the terrestrial globe were “reduced to nothing?”
According to Locher, on the basis of Copernicus’s theory, one should predict
that “no hail or rain would fall from the clouds, but would only be carried
naturally around; nor would any ﬁre or ﬂaming thing ascend, since in their
view, probably, there is no ﬁre above. . . . Which, however, experience and
reason refute” (Galilei 1967, 243).
Salviati refuses to answer Locher’s questions, as he believes it makes lit-
tle sense to discuss what would happen in situations that run counter to the
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ordinary course of nature (cf. Palmerino 2011, 118). In reaction to Locher’s
ﬁrst argument Salviati observes that “if by God’s will the earth should stop
its diurnal whirling, the birds would do whatever that same will of God de-
sired” (Galilei 1967, 240). As for the second argument, Salviati declares to
know “just as much about what would happen after the earth was annihi-
lated” as one could know “aboutwhatwasgoing to takeplace on it and around
it before it was created” (245). According to Salviati, experience cannot serve
as a guide for the evaluation of scholastic arguments de potentia Dei absoluta,
because “whatever begins with a Divine miracle or an angelic operation . . .
is not unlikely to do everything else by means of the same principle” (237).
Galileo would agree with those philosophers of science who claim that in
order to be effective, a thought experiment must describe a situation that can
be handled on the basis of past experience (Kuhn 1977, 252). For nothing
meaningful can be said about scenarios in which the laws of nature have been
abrogated (Wilkes 1988, 15ff.; Rescher 2005, 152–53).
4. Conclusion. In an article bearing the evocative title “WhenAre Thought
Experiments Poor Ones?” Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson have ar-
gued that thought experiments are successful “if they induce the same—true
or false—belief in the majority of people that are exposed to them” (2003,
307). They are, by contrast, “poor ones” if they lead to contradictory con-
clusions, if they beg the question, or if the scenarios imagined are too far-
fetched.
If one takes into account not only the epistemic power of imaginary sce-
narios but also their rhetorical and didactic value, the distinction between
good and poor thought experiments becomes blurred. As we have seen in
this article, only some of the thought experiments described in Galileo’s di-
alogues induce the same belief in the three interlocutors. This type of thought
experiments is usually invoked by Salviati or Sagredo to challenge some fun-
damental tenets of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, such as the nature of grav-
ity or the cause of projectile motion. Simplicio gives an instinctive, often not
well-argued answer to the “what would happen?” question—an answer that
the reader cannot but endorse. The Socratic dialogue that follows has the aim
of showing that Simplicio’s intuitive knowledge about the behavior of falling
bodies and projectiles is in agreement with everyday experience but clashes
with the principles of Aristotle’s theory of motion.
In Galileo’s dialogues one encounters, however, also “poor” thought ex-
periments that elicit different intuitions in the three interlocutors. By letting
his ﬁctional characters (a) draw diverging conclusions from an imaginary
scenario, (b) accuse one another of begging the question in their proposed
solutions, and (c) reject one another’s thought experiments as meaningless
or overly far-fetched, Galileo brings to light the incompatibility between the
AristotelianandCopernicanworldviews.Hesuggests,moreover, that theeval-
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uation of an imaginary scenario is a theory-laden undertaking, as one’s the-
oretical assumptions inﬂuence not only one’s intuitions about what would
happen but also one’s ideas concerning the cogency and meaningfulness of
a thought experiment.
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